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On 29th of April, representatives of the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia participated in the ninth high-level meeting organised by the European Commission on the implementation of European Union (EU) restrictive measures. During the meeting, representatives of EU Member States, the European Commission, the European External Action Service and partner countries discussed the effectiveness of sanctions regimes, current trends in sanctions violations, as well as opportunities to strengthen a unified approach to sanctions implementation and prevent sanctions breaches. The meeting was chaired by Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union Maria Luís Albuquerque. “Such formats of international cooperation are important for building a common understanding of sanctions risks, promoting information exchange, and strengthening practical cooperation among EU Member States and international partners. Effective sanctions implementation is an essential prerequisite for ensuring European security and the rule of law,” emphasised Marta Tilhena. Particular attention was devoted to the recently adopted 20th sanctions package, including the first-ever application of the EU anti-circumvention instrument. In response to increasing trade flows of high-priority goods to certain third countries and potential sanctions circumvention risks, the EU introduced a prohibition on the export of specific goods to the Kyrgyz Republic. The measures aim to reduce the risk that such goods could be re-exported to Russia and used for the needs of its military-industrial complex. The meeting also addressed issues related to restrictions on Russian energy exports, the activities of the so-called “shadow fleet,” the use of alternative payment networks in third countries, and the impact of sanctions on Russia’s ability to finance warfare. Participants discussed the latest trends and typologies of sanctions violations, as well as effective solutions for preventing and investigating sanctions breaches. At the same time, the importance of the EU’s international dialogue with third countries was highlighted. Discussions included examples where financial institutions and supervisory authorities in third countries introduced significant improvements in sanctions risk management following the imposition of EU sanctions. In certain cases, after assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of these improvements, financial institutions were subsequently removed from EU sanctions lists. Member States also shared practical experience in sanctions enforcement and investigations of sanctions violations, including the detention and seizure of “shadow fleet” vessels, as well as criminal proceedings in cases where sanctioned goods had been attempted to be delivered to Russia through third countries. Following the high-level meeting, the Sanctions Coordinators Forum took place under the leadership of EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan. Representatives from Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and other partner countries also participated in the forum, discussing the impact of sanctions and strengthening future international cooperation. During the meetings, the importance of intelligence-sharing and interinstitutional cooperation in effective sanctions implementation was also emphasised, alongside the need to continue close cooperation with third countries and the private sector in sanctions risk management. Since April 2024, the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia has been the national competent authority for sanctions implementation.

Main elements of the 20th sanctions package Sectoral sanctions The list of goods subject to expanded export and transit restrictions has been broadened The new sanctions package includes additional goods whose export to Russia or transit through Russia is prohibited, as they can be used to support the enhancement of Russia’s military and technological capabilities. The export ban will apply to goods such as natural and synthetic rubber, iron or steel screws, and other cast iron or steel articles, etc. First-time application of an export ban on goods to third countries Observing a rapid increase in trade flows of high-priority goods in certain neighbouring countries of Russia, which may indicate sanctions circumvention through the use of import or export bans, a regulatory framework was introduced prohibiting the export of goods to third countries. With the adoption of the 20th sanctions package, for the first time within this framework, specific goods have been designated that are prohibited for export to a particular third country. Going forward, it is prohibited to export to the Kyrgyz Republic goods under CN code 8457 10 (multi-purpose machine tools for working metal) and CN code 8517 62 (machines for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice, images or other data, including switching and routing apparatus), taking into account the potential risk of re-export to Russia. Within this restriction, additional goods and third countries may be added in the future, where the export of such goods would also be prohibited. New import bans The list of goods prohibited for import from Russia has been expanded, as these goods generate significant revenue for Russia, thereby enabling it to carry out activities that destabilize the situation in Ukraine. Under the new sanctions package, the import ban will apply to goods such as salt, pebbles, gravel, crushed stone, iron ore concentrates, anhydrous ammonia, as well as various copper and aluminium products, etc. The EU identifies persons supporting Russia’s defence and security sector 60 legal entities have been added to the sanctions list for activities that contribute to strengthening Russia’s military and technological capabilities, thereby directly supporting the development of its defence and security sector. The listed entities include both Russian and third-country persons. New prohibition on the provision of services to the Russian government It is now prohibited to provide services to the Government of Russia and to persons established in Russia that could contribute to its technological development. In particular, the provision of managed security services is prohibited. Managed security services include activities related to cybersecurity risk management or support, such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consulting, including expert advice related to technical support. Restriction on the re-publication of Russian propaganda media content In the EU, not only the broadcasting of content produced by media outlets supporting Kremlin narratives listed under Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 will be prohibited, but also its real-time re-publication (mirroring), in order to prevent circumvention of the restrictions. Restrictions on transactions involving ports used to circumvent oil price cap measures The list of ports and locks with which any transactions are prohibited has been expanded, adding two ports located in Russia and one in a third country. Energy sector Shadow fleet Under the new sanctions package, vessels may be classified as part of the “shadow fleet” not only if they transport crude oil and petroleum products of Russian origin, but also if they carry mineral products, such as natural raw materials required for industrial use, including salt, potassium carbonate, and others. An additional 46 shadow fleet vessels have been identified under the 20th sanctions package and included in the sanctions list. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) related service bans As of 1 January 2027, a ban will enter into force on the provision of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal services to Russian companies or entities owned or controlled by Russian persons. The ban includes services such as loading, unloading, storage, bunkering, and others. A new prohibition is also introduced on providing technical assistance, brokerage, or financial services to LNG tankers and icebreakers operating in Russian waters, flying the Russian flag, or owned or operated by Russian persons. Icebreakers may be actively used to strengthen the shadow fleet in Russia’s northern region. Measures to reduce the potential sale of tankers to Russian persons Tankers intended for the transport of crude oil and petroleum products are prohibited from being sold or transferred to Russian persons or for use in Russia. To reduce the risk that a third-country buyer of a tanker from an EU entity subsequently resells or transfers it to a Russian person, the vessel owner must, prior to sale, identify potential risks and establish an internal compliance system to mitigate the risk of the vessel ending up in Russia. The purchase agreement must include a clause prohibiting the resale of the tanker to a person in Russia or for use in Russia. Targeted financial sanctions The Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 has been amended to include: 37 natural persons 80 legal entities Inclusion in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 entails an obligation to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held, or controlled by these persons, entities, or bodies. In addition, it is prohibited to directly or indirectly make funds or economic resources available to or for the benefit of these persons, entities, or bodies. Financial sector Four third-country banks have been identified that use the Russian Central Bank’s SPFS system or otherwise significantly hinder the achievement of the EU sanctions objectives Persons residing in the EU are prohibited from engaging in cooperation or carrying out any transactions with banks that use the Russian Central Bank’s SPFS system, provide crypto-asset services supporting Russia’s military aggression, or significantly impede the objectives set out in the sanctions framework. Under the new sanctions package, four additional such third-country financial institutions have been added. The list of financial institutions subject to transaction bans has also been expanded by adding 20 financial institutions. Additional restrictions targeting crypto-assets In addition to the previously established restrictions on the crypto-asset A7A5, the new sanctions package introduces a prohibition on transactions related to two additional crypto-assets still in the implementation phase - RUBx and Digital Rouble, the digital currencies of the Russian Central Bank. A prohibition is also introduced on any transactions with legal persons established in Russia that provide crypto-asset or exchange services. Furthermore, it is prohibited to engage in transactions with legal persons established outside the EU that are not financial institutions but provide crypto-asset or payment services enabling international transactions that could be used to circumvent restrictive measures. Ban on receiving donations from the Russian research sector It is prohibited to receive donations or other forms of financial support from Russian public or private research organisations, higher education institutions, as well as companies engaged in research or innovation development. Impact of sanctions on Belarus With the 20th sanctions package, new restrictive measures have been adopted against Belarus for supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The introduced measures are similar to those imposed on Russia. The list of prohibited services has been expanded to include a ban on the provision of tourism services and a ban on the provision of managed security services. Stricter restrictions have also been introduced in relation to crypto-assets, and new categories of goods subject to import and export bans have been defined. The export ban will now apply to goods such as various rubber products, metal wires, and certain types of agricultural machinery, while the import ban will apply to salt, anhydrous ammonia, iron ore, and other materials that can generate significant revenue for Belarus. The targeted financial sanctions lists have also been expanded, adding three legal entities. In addition, the requirement to obtain prior authorisation from the competent authority before providing services to parts of the governments of Russia and Belarus will no longer apply to Russian and Belarusian diplomatic and consular representations.

The Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia (FIU Latvia) has published its 2025 Annual Report, highlighting key achievements in financial intelligence, sanctions implementation, and international cooperation. “In 2025, the FIU continued its engagement across several key areas. In line with our mission – to safeguard the security of our country and its financial system, we continued to develop financial intelligence, ensure the effective implementation of sanctions, and enhance cooperation with national and international partners. At the same time, we continued our work as part of the 6th round MONEYVAL evaluation that had already started in 2024. Collaboration – and most importantly the quality of that collaboration – was the defining factor behind the results we achieved across all areas of our work in 2025,” emphasizes the Head of the FIU Latvia Toms Platacis. Positive international assessment strengthens Latvia’s reputation Last year, Latvia’s 6th-round evaluation report was adopted at the FATF/MONEYVAL plenary meeting. The report highlights that Latvia achieved high or substantial levels of effectiveness in all Immediate Outcomes (IOs), except one. The work carried out under the leadership of the FIU Latvia demonstrated the effectiveness of Latvia’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation financing (AML/CFT/CPF) system and its compliance with international standards, significantly strengthening the country’s international reputation. As a result of these efforts, on 19 February 2026, MONEYVAL published its report on the results of Latvia’s mutual evaluation. Read more: https://www.fid.gov.lv/en/news/latvias-amlcft-system-internationally-recognised-as-overall-effective Strengthened financial intelligence and analytical capacity In 2025, the FIU continued to strengthen its financial intelligence capabilities, focusing on the effective identification and prevention of financial crime. The FIU prepared and disseminated 612 analytical materials to law enforcement authorities (LEAs), supervisory and control authorities, and other institutions, and also produced 10 strategic and 12 tactical analytical studies. Read more: https://fid.gov.lv/en/roles-and-responsibilities/strategic-analysis-and-guidelines FIU received more than 5,500 suspicious transaction reports and nearly 100,000 threshold declarations. Given the structure of criminal offences reflected in suspicious transaction reports and requests from LEAs, the FIU Latvia’s financial intelligence activities in 2025 – and the analytical reports subsequently provided to competent authorities – were primarily related to fraud and cybercrime, sanctions violations, tax evasion, and subsequent and stand-alone money laundering. Our innovative OpCEN cooperation platform and the latest “Black-Box” solution also significantly assisted in achieving the high standard operational results. OpCEN is an FIU’s initiative established to ensure close operational cooperation between the FIU and LEAs in the investigation of complex financial crime, continued to play a significant role in strengthening the effectiveness of financial intelligence. In 2025 OpCEN was joined for the first time also by our close cooperation partners from the private sector – financial institutions. In 2024, the FIU data finder “Black-Box” was created – a technical solution that provides LEAs with a possibility of matching data at LEA disposal with the data available in the FIU database on a hit/no-hit basis. Strengthened sanctions implementation and contribution to international security 2025 marked the first full calendar year since the FIU Latvia began performing the function of the competent authority for the sanctions implementation. Last year, the FIU Latvia worked purposefully to ensure effective and consistent implementation of sanctions, recognising that sanctions are an essential tool not only for strengthening Latvia’s national, but also regional and EU security. In order to ensure effective implementation of sanctions in Latvia, the FIU has taken a series of targeted measures based on providing the public with clear and practical information on the implementation of sanctions, as well as close cooperation and coordination with national and international partners. By the end of 2025, the FIU Latvia sanctions website contained information on 156 sanctioned persons and entities with frozen assets in Latvia, including funds amounting to EUR 153 million. Meanwhile, the number of reports concerning potential sanctions violations increased by approximately 80% compared to the previous year. The FIU’s analytical work also contributed to strengthening sanctions against Russia, including the identification of vessels associated with the so-called “shadow fleet.” Nearly 10% of the vessels added to the EU sanctions list in 2025 were identified by FIU Latvia. Cooperation as the key driver of effectiveness The FIU’s functions cannot be carried out without effective cooperation with LEAs, including national security agencies and the Prosecutor Office, as well as obliged entities and supervisory and control institutions. To promote such cooperation, the FIU Latvia coordinates interaction among the relevant institutions and obliged entities by convening meetings of the “cooperation coordination group’’ (CCG). This CCG serves as both a public-private and public-public cooperation platform. During the year, 296 CCG meetings were held, involving 260 law enforcement officers and prosecutors. In 2025, the FIU Latvia received 276 requests from LEAs, national security agencies, and the Prosecutor Office. The FIU Latvia’s operational results were built upon extensive cooperation with partners in Latvia and abroad. In 2025, operational cooperation was conducted with financial intelligence units from 65 countries. At the EU level, in 2025, the launch of the newly established Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) was an important step in the fight against financial crime. Latvia is represented among AMLA’s first appointed experts by a specialist from the FIU, underscoring the country's contribution to the authority’s work. Participation in the work of AMLA provides an opportunity to represent Latvia’s experience in the field of AML/CFT/CPF, as well as to contribute to the formation and development of a common European financial security system. The full 2025 Annual Report is available on the FIU Latvia website: https://fid.gov.lv/en/about-us/annual-report   The Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia is an independent authority responsible for preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, implementing sanctions, protecting the Latvian financial system from misuse, and cooperating with international partners.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has provided significant clarification regarding the application of sanctions in cases where a legal entity itself is not included on the sanctions list, but is controlled by a person or entity included on the EU sanctions list. The case was brought after Lithuanian credit institutions froze the company’s assets on the grounds that 50% of the company’s shares were owned by a person included on the EU sanctions list (EU sanctions regime against Belarus). The company challenged this decision, and the Lithuanian Supreme Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its judgment, the Court of Justice of the EU emphasized that the sanctions regime applies not only to persons directly included on the EU sanctions list, but also to companies owned or controlled by persons included on the sanctions list. This approach is essential to prevent the circumvention of sanctions and to ensure the effective application of the freezing of funds and economic resources. The Court of Justice of the European Union noted that the concept of “control” must be interpreted broadly, encompassing both direct and indirect influence over an undertaking. At the same time, it was recognized that in cases where the sanctioned entity holds 50% of the company’s shares, it is deemed to control the company and its assets. However, this presumption may be challenged. EU Member States must ensure a mechanism that allows both the company and the sanctioned entity to challenge the freezing of funds and, if necessary, obtain their release. Latvia also submitted its opinion in this case, thereby contributing to the refinement of EU sanctions enforcement practices. In light of this judgment, the Financial Intelligence Unit reminds that compliance with sanctions involves more than just a formal check of individuals against sanctions lists. The current list of sanctioned entities whose funds are frozen in Latvia can be viewed here. In addition, the FID encourages the use of the Sanctions Search Tool, which allows for the convenient and efficient verification of natural and legal persons subject to UN, European Union, or Latvian national sanctions.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) has dismissed appeals brought by five leading businesspersons operating in Russia, thereby confirming the legality of the restrictive measures imposed on them, including the freezing of funds. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion ofUkraine in February 2022, the EU imposed sanctions on individuals operating insectors that generate significant revenue for the Russian Government. Five businesspersons – Dmitry Alexandrovich Pumpyanskiy, Tigran Khudaverdyan, Viktor Filippovich Rashnikov, Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, and German Khan – challenged the sanctions beforethe EU courts. After their actions were dismissed by the General Court in 2023, appeals were brought before the Court of Justice. In its judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed that the sanctions are justified. It emphasised that it is the economic sectors, rather than the businesspersons themselves, that constitute a substantial source of revenue for the Russian Government. The Court also clarified that the “influence” of businesspersons must be assessed in the context of the economic environment in which they operate, regardless of any direct link to the Russian Government. Given their significant role in the Russian economy, such persons may indirectly contribute to the financing of actions destabilising Ukraine by supporting the profitability of the sectors in which they are active. Furthermore, the Court underlined that the criteria underlying restrictive measures are lawful unless they are manifestly inappropriate. Such criteria may target categories of persons that have an objective link to a third country subject to EU sanctions, even if that link is indirect and independent of any individual conduct. In this case, the Court found an objective link between businesspersons active in sectors that are economically significant for Russia and the EU’s objective of increasing pressure on the country and raising the cost of its actions against Ukraine. Finally, the Court confirmed that restrictive measures are proportionate if they are not manifestly inappropriate for achieving their legitimate objective and do not exceed what is necessary to achieve it. These conditions were met in the present cases. The judgment reinforces the legalframework of the EU sanctions regime and confirms the approach of applying economic pressure to persons associated with strategically important sectors ofthe Russian economy. 

On 16 March 2026, the Riga City Court found the defendant guilty of participating in activities carried out by an organized group with the aim of assisting a foreign state in undermining the territorial integrity and political independence of another democratic state, as well as of violating sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), committed by a group of persons pursuant to a prior agreement and causing substantial harm. The court sentenced the defendant to 11 years of imprisonment, three years of probation supervision, and expulsion from the Republic of Latvia, with a five-year ban on re-entry. With regard to three other defendants - two Latvian citizens and one Latvian non-citizen - the criminal proceedings were separated into a distinct case during the trial. The investigation established that the organized group ordered several dozen “Starlink Mini Kit” satellite internet systems online from the U.S. company SpaceX, which provide internet access almost anywhere. Other goods suitable for military purposes were also acquired, including weapon parts, cartridge cases, bullets, and ballistic weather meters. The total value of these goods amounted to approximately EUR 200,000. These goods were transported to Russia and sold to individuals associated with the Russian armed forces, with the knowledge that the goods were intended for use in Russia’s military attack against Ukraine. It was also known that some of these goods were subject to EU restrictions prohibiting their transfer to any natural or legal person, entity, or body in Russia. As a result of these actions, the security interests of Ukraine and the international community were significantly endangered, as substantial support was provided to Russia in carrying out its military aggression against Ukraine. No person shall be considered guilty until their guilt in committing a criminal offence has been established in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Law. Information prepared by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Latvia.

On 14 March 2026, the Council of the European Union (EU) decided to extend targeted financial sanctions against Russia, continuing to target individuals associated with its military aggression against Ukraine. On 27 February, targeted financial sanctions against Belarus were also extended. In connection with the continuation of the sanctions regime, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) reminds that the “Frozen Assets” section is constantly available on the website sankcijas.fid.gov.lv, where information is published about Sanctioned persons whose funds or economic resources are frozen in Latvia. As of March 16, 2026, assets owned, controlled or held by a total of 160 sanctioned entities have been frozen in Latvia. Of these: 23 are individuals or legal entities directly included in the sanctions list,137 are legal entities owned or controlled by sanctioned persons. The “Frozen Assets” section provides detailed information on various types of frozen assets, as well as data in Excel format on sanctioned entities for which FID has received information. Cooperation with companies in Russia is particularly high risk FIU emphasizes that any cooperation with persons directly included in the sanctions lists is prohibited. The sanctions lists also include influential Russian businessmen who own or control enterprises and economic sectors of strategic importance to Russia. In order to prevent circumvention of the sanctions restrictions, the sanctions also apply to companies owned or controlled by these persons. Therefore, cooperation with companies owned or controlled by persons included in the sanctions list is generally prohibited. Therefore, the risk of being involved in a violation of sanctions is particularly high when cooperating with merchants in Russia. To ensure compliance with sanctions, it is not enough to formally verify whether the cooperation partner is included in the sanctions list. In addition, it is necessary to assess whether the company is owned or controlled by a person included in the sanctions list. This also applies to cases where sectoral sanctions do not restrict the sale of specific goods or the provision of services to Russian persons. In targeted financial sanctions, the decisive factor is who the persons involved in the transaction are and who benefits from the transaction. The FIU further recalls that the responsibility for compliance with sanctions, as well as for assessing the appropriateness of a particular transaction or activity, remains with the individual. This applies to both targeted financial sanctions and sectoral sanctions and includes the obligation to conduct due diligence based on the available information and the applicable sanctions regulatory framework. The FIU website also provides guidelines in Latvian language for managing sanctions risks in transactions with heightened-risk countries, which provide practical recommendations for complying with sanctions and mitigating risks: Guidelines.pdf EU individual sanctions against individuals and organisations undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine have been in place since 2014 and cover a wide range of individuals – including senior officials, companies, oligarchs and other regime supporters. Since April 2024, the FIU has been the national competent authority for sanctions implementation in Latvia. The targeted financial sanctions are imposed in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Targeted financial sanctions against Belarus were imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Targeted financial sanctions may be violated, including by conducting transactions with a person who is a subject of sanctions (directly included in the list of targeted financial sanctions or owned or controlled by a person included in the list of sanctions); by conducting transactions with a credit institution that is subject to targeted financial sanctions; by supplying goods to a merchant who then supplies them to the subject of sanctions; by conducting a transaction that indirectly benefits the subject of sanctions (for example, by leasing goods from a merchant whose owner is a subject of sanctions); by purchasing such goods from a merchant whose manufacturer is a subject of sanctions.

On February 20, 2026, a new general administrative act (General Licence) adopted by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) entered into force. The new General Licence essentially retains the regulation of the general harmonisation of 27 December 2024, while clarifying and supplementing it with new categories of payments, including payments to sworn advocates, sworn notaries, state and local government institutions of the Republic of Latvia and debt recovery service providers registered in the Republic of Latvia, for the performance of which sanctioned subjects do not require a separate FIU authorisation. With the entry into force of the new general agreement, the previous general agreement of 27 December 2024 will cease to be valid. The new general agreement can be found on the FIU website.

Latvia has received an international assessment confirming the country’s effectiveness in fighting financial crime, thus strengthening financial sector integrity and contributing to safety and security of international financial system. The leading AML/CFT evaluation highlights that Latvia has a robust, well-coordinated and highly effective system to combat money laundering, terrorism and proliferation financing. On Thursday, 19 February the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism - MONEYVAL published its report on the results of Latvia’s mutual evaluation. The report highlights that Latvia achieved high or substantial levels of effectiveness in all Immediate Outcomes (IOs), except one. Overall, the findings recognize Latvia’s significant progress and its long-term commitment to fighting money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing. "We have eliminated high risks in the financial sector, and Latvia is a safe and reliable country for investment. This is also confirmed by Latvia's choice to be among the first countries to be assessed according to the new FATF standards. We are pleased that the government's targeted work has yielded results," says Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia Evika Siliņa about what has been achieved.Minister for Finance of the Republic of Latvia Arvils Ašeradens: "Following the financial sector turmoil of 2018, Latvia made a deliberate political decision to implement profound structural reforms, building a transparent, secure, and internationally compliant financial sector supervisory system." Today, we have a regulatory and supervisory framework built on effectiveness, interinstitutional cooperation, and a risk-based approach. This is a crucial aspect of national security and economic competitiveness. A strong and reliable financial system boosts investor confidence. It helps mitigate reputational risks and strengthens Latvia’s position as a secure and attractive partner in the international financial system. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) played a central role in this process, coordinating efforts across the country and ensuring a unified approach to identifying and understanding risks. Financial crimes are no longer viewed solely as economic offences, but as threats to national stability and security and appropriate response is given. "This evaluation sends a strong signal that Latvia is now recognised as a reliable and effective partner in the global fight against financial crime and sanctions evasion," says Head of the FIU Toms Platacis. He adds: "The real test ahead is maintaining proportionality. A mature system knows when intervention is necessary and when it is not. By applying the risk-based approach decisively while ensuring that low-risk sectors are not burdened unnecessarily, Latvia strengthens its credibility and remains fully aligned with leading international standards." The report recognizes the FIU as a highly effective institution and a global leader in international co-operation. Supported by secure and innovative co-ordination mechanisms, the FIU plays a central role in Latvia’s AML/CFT/CPF system by producing high-quality financial intelligence, leading national risk assessments, and enabling successful money laundering investigations through continuous strategic guidance, training, and inter-agency co-operation. As previously reported, on 13 June 2025, the joint FATF/MONEYVAL Plenary concluded with the adoption of Latvia’s 6th round mutual evaluation report. Latvia is the first country to be assessed under the new round of evaluations in the FATF Global network. Latvia’s evaluation assessed the measures implemented and the results achieved during the period from 11 November 2017 to 15 November 2024. About the mutual evaluation This is the leading international assessment in the field of AML/CFT/CPF, conducting ongoing peer reviews of each member to assess levels of implementation of the FATF Standards, providing an in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system. Mutual evaluation of Latvia assessed the effectiveness of the country’s AML/CFT/CPF measures, and their level of compliance with the FATF Standards, at the time of an on-site visit in November 2024. The FATF (Financial Action Task Force) is an international organisation that sets and monitors standards for the prevention of money laundering, terrorism and proliferation financing (AML/CFT/CPF). MONEYVAL (Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism) is a committee of experts of the Council of Europe that assesses member states against FATF standards and in accordance with FATF methodology. More information: https://fid.gov.lv/en/roles-and-responsibilities/moneyval-2